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INTRODUCTION 
Defendants/Appellees Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless ("Law 
Firm"), Clark Waddoups ("Waddoups"), Jonathan O. Hafen ("Hafen") and Justin 
P. Matkin ("Matkin"), collectively "defendants", in the Brief of Appellees ("Def. 
Br."), appear to attempt to sidestep the simple question on which certiorari was 
authorized, namely: "Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district 
court's dismissal of the Petitioners' complaint." Order granting certiorari, dated 
November 23, 2010. 
The question on which certiorari was granted is resolved by applying a 
single standard, the standard of Rule 12(b)(6), to a single document, the First 
Amended Complaint ("FAC"). See Opening Brief of Appellants ("PI. Br."), at 2-3 
(Statement of The Issues Presented on Appeal). That statement is unchallenged 
by defendants. 
Nevertheless, defendants do not address that issue and that standard, 
instead passing it like ships in the night. Starting with the "Statement of Issues 
and Standards of Review" section ("DB Issues"), the Def. Br. tries to reshape the 
issue on which certiorari was granted and the applicable standard. In the DB 
Issues, defendants argue: 'To protect the trade secrets, lomed retained the 
Parr firm to file a complaint and obtain discovery orders authorizing the seizure of 
Mr. Yanaki's computer files for in-camera review. [Emphasis added]" The FAC 
subject to the certiorari issue never, however, pleads in any way that any trade 
secrets actually existed or that any action was to protect trade secrets. Instead, 
1 
the FAC pleads: "[Defendants' client] desired to misuse a legal process to cause 
an illegal raid on the Home as a form of message to its employees that they 
would be better off signing new agreements than leaving and risking their own 
homes being raided[ ]" and "Defendants agreed to help their cl ient... [by] 
ostensibly protecting trade secrets and conducting discovery in civil litigation, 
rather than what they were really doing, namely, seeking to have the Police 
conduct an illegal raid." FAC fflj 8-9, R.131. The distortion in defendants' 
argument might be attributed to simple error, except that such misstatements of 
both fact and law permeate the Def. Br. to such an extent that one might 
conclude they are deliberate. 
The Def. Br. repeatedly refers to the original, superseded complaint.1 Such 
references improperly suggest to this Court that the matters discussed are from 
the FAC or that ruminations about changes between the superseded complaint, 
and the operative FAC are pertinent to the applicable standard, when they are 
not. Defendants further divert attention from the FAC by including, in their 
1
"Once a party has amended a pleading, the amended pleading 
supercedes the original pleading, and the original pleading performs no function 
in the case." Campbell v. Debry, 2001 UT App 397, H 17, 38 P.3d 984, 990 (citing 
6 Federal Practice & Procedure, Wright, Miller & Kane § 1476 (1990)). 
Defendants seek to beg question from changes between the original complaint 
and the FAC, matters wholly inapposite to the issue or the standard of review: 
"Missing from the amended complaint are allegations of fraud in obtaining the 
discovery orders. (Compare R. 11-32, with 129-38.) Plaintiffs have never 
explained how the nature of events concerning the discovery orders changed 
once plaintiffs settled their claims against lomed more than three years after the 
discovery orders were issued." Def. Br., at 7. 
2 
"Statement of Facts," a multitude of "facts" that nowhere appear in the FAC. For 
example, defendants characterize the "discovery order" in the "lomed lawsuit" 
with no citation to the FAC and then selectively excerpt quotes from an 
attachment not to the FAC but rather their clients own complaint attached as an 
exhibit to the superseded complaint. Def. Br. at 11-12. Defendants neatly omit 
that Matkin and co-conspirators "illegally entered the Home without lawful 
authority, justification or consent, then illegally searched it and illegally 
seized property belonging to Moss, Yanaki and third parties; all the while, 
Kopp and the defendants knew that the legal process obtained could not be used 
lawfully to threaten to kick in the door to the Home, threaten to 'detain' anyone 
who interfered with such illegal act, search the Home or seize property therein." 
FAC H 30, R. 136. 
The selective omission of material allegations pertinent to the certiorari 
issue and standard of review is, like the use of materials outside the FAC, 
pervasive in the Def. Br. Unfortunately, page limits prevent a full exposition of the 
breadth and nature of these and other traits of the Def. Br. that attempt to lead 
the reader away from the central issue presented on certiorari and the standard 
of review for that issue. Likewise, the overabundance of case law cited in the 
Def. Br. prevents a full exposition of the unrelatedness of each case through 
extensive analysis. However, the categories of the propositions for which those 
cases are offered can and is, below, distinguished from the actual issue 
presented on certiorari and the actual, applicable legal principles. 
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A note of caution must therefore accompany the reading of and weight 
assigned to the "facts" and legal authorities found in the Def. Br. The only 
material facts under the standard of review for this Court are the facts set forth in 
the operative FAC and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. 
The only material issue is whether the Court of Appeals' affirmance of dismissal 
of the FAC, on a pleadings motion, was proper. 
ARGUMENT 
I. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THERE IS "STATE ACTION" MOSS AND YANAKI 
HAVE A PROTECTED RIGHT OF PRIVACY; ABSENT A VALID SEARCH WARRANT, 
THEIR HOME COULD NOT BE INVADED WITHOUT GIVING RISE TO TORT 
LIABILITY. 
It seems like an obvious proposition that if someone threatens to kick in the 
door of another's home and threatens to "detain" the homeowner while an 
unauthorized search of the home is committed, that the occupant of the home 
has suffered multiple injuries for which the common law provides remedies. 
There has been extreme emotional distress inflicted by the unlawful entry into 
and search of the home by strangers- a clearly extreme and outrageous act. 
There has been an invasion of the homeowners' privacy. There has been a 
trespass onto the homeowners' real property. There has been a trespass on and 
conversion of the chattels which belong to the homeowner. And if the invader or 
invaders had entered into an agreement with others who were not present but 
who facilitated the invasion the co-conspirators would share equal culpability and 
liability. There could be no question that a burglar could, in addition to criminal 
4 
liability, be sued civilly by the homeowner for the commission of such torts. 
But defendants here, one of whom actually directly committed the acts 
described above and all of whom conspired with others to cause the illegal 
invasion, claim that a complaint, the FAC, that pleads such conduct, does not 
state any claim for relief against them. 
Why? Well, they say, they obtained an ex parte order from a judge, in a 
lawsuit against one of the homeowners, absent at the time of the illegal search 
and seizure, and who had left their clients' employment some four months earlier. 
They assert that by waiving that order in front of the homeowner and having an 
armed, uniformed police officer doing the waiving and threatening to kick in the 
door, the common law does not apply to them- even though it would apply to 
anyone else. Now consider the true requisite to avoid liability under the common 
law for a search and seizure conducted within a person's home. The consent of 
the homeowner is one way to avoid liability. That did not occur here. The other 
way is to be a peace officer, either armed with a valid search warrant or with well 
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, none of which existed here. 
The defendants borrow from the decision in the action brought by Moss 
and Yanaki against defendants in the federal courts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
They say that the federal court found no "state action" and so the state court 
should likewise find no "state action." But whether "state action" existed to 
support a section 1983 claim does not affect the existence of common law 
5 
remedies for violations of fundamental rights.2 
defendants cite Torres v. First State Bank, 588 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 
1978), to support their argument that "[a] private actor does not act under state 
law 'where the only infirmities are the excess of the court orders itself, subject to 
immediate modification by a court having jurisdiction over the parties, and subject 
to the normal process of appeal.'" Brief at 30 (quoting Torres at 1326-27). In 
Torres, the court recognized the holding of Judge Murrah in Bottone v. Lindsley, 
170 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1948), cert, denied, 336 U.S. 944, 69 S. Ct. 810, 93 L.Ed. 
1101 (1949), where he concluded: 
It is conceivable that persons, either individually or acting in concert 
might so use the state judicial process as to deprive a person of 
his property without due process of law, or of equal protection of 
the laws, yet we are certain that to make out a cause of action under 
the Civil Rights Statutes, the state court proceedings must have 
been a complete nullity, with a purpose to deprive a person of 
his property without due process of law. To hold otherwise would 
open the door wide to every aggrieved litigant in a state court 
proceedings, and set the federal courts up as an arbiter of the 
correctness of every state decision. 
Torres at 1326 (emphasis added). The purpose for the warrantless search 
was to instill fear in the other lomed employees. Due process was ignored, 
factual support overlooked, and constitutional rights trampled by the 
warrantless search by the defendants' threat of force. Judge Murah 
describes the behavior by the defendants perfectly, as the illegal warrant 
and warrantless search were a complete nullity with a purpose to deprive 
Yanaki and Moss of not only their property, but of their constitutional right 
to privacy, without due process of law. Defendants cite State v. Watts, 750 
P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988), as support for their argument that the Utah 
Constitution applies exclusively to state actors and include the following 
quote: "[Unreasonable private searches are not subject to the protection of 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution." Def. Br. at 30-31. Defendants 
go on to say that all of the cases cited in the Opening Brief are not 
applicable and are beside the point. Def. Br. at 31. However, the court in 
Watts recognized that "[a] search conducted by a private person acting as 
the agent of a governmental authority is not a private search. In such an 
instance, the protections of the fourth amendment do have application, as 
do the protections of Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution." Watts at 
1221. In Watts, an informant met a police officer in front of the defendant's 
house and notified him that the defendant was growing marijuana in a 
greenhouse in his backyard. Id at 1220. Later that day, police returned with 
a warrant to search the shed. Id. Prior to the search, the police had told the 
informant that if he provided information against the defendant, charges 
(continued...) 
fi 
They continue by arguing that with no "state action" the privacy protections of the 
United States and Utah Constitutions are inapposite to this case: "The legal 
assumption is incorrect because the Parr firm, as affirmed by the Tenth Circuit, is 
not a state actor, and, as a result, constitutional search and seizure provisions 
are not a limit on its conduct." Def. Br. 19. 
But if there was no state action at all (as opposed to "state action" for 
purposes of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is the context before the 
federal district court), then there was no valid search warrant. Without a valid 
search warrant, defendants could lawfully obtain entrance to Moss and Yanaki's 
home and remove Yanaki and Moss' property therefrom by the consent of Moss 
and Yanaki. And since no consent was given, defendants have no defense 
available to them. Defendants also ignore the fact that they hired, and paid, an 
armed, uniformed, deputy sheriff, Heinz Kopp ("Kopp"), who threatened to kick in 
Moss and Yanaki's door and who gained entry and conducted, along with Matkin 
and other co-conspirators, the search and seizure.3 
2(...continued) 
against him might be dismissed. Id. The district court denied the 
defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained through the search 
because the motion lacked sufficient evidence that the informant was 
operating under an agency relationship with the police department. Id. The 
facts of Watts are clearly distinguishable and void any application to the 
case before this Court. 
3
 The United States and Utah Constitutions certainly applied to Kopp. He 
agreed to help defendants get into the home of Moss and Yanaki and take their 
property. Kopp succeeded in that effort. Kopp needed a lawful search warrant. 
Kopp did not seek or obtain a lawful search warrant. Absent a lawful search 
warrant, Kopp, no differently than defendants, could not enter Yanaki and Moss' 
(continued...) 
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So the point of this action is that no one could enter Moss and Yanaki's 
home and take their property without their consent without being subject to 
liability for the common law torts they committed. Defendants cannot rely on 
Kopp to avoid liability because he needs either consent or a valid search warrant. 
Kopp had none of the above and so defendants cannot rely on some claim that 
Kopp could enter the home and therefore they could rely on Kopp's right to do so. 
At the end of the day, it does not matter whther there was state action. 
Nobody, not Kopp and not the defendants, could pass the threhhold of Moss and 
Yanaki's home without a valid search warrant. 
II. UTAH LAW BARS PRIVATE SEARCH WARRANTS. 
Call it whatever defendants wish to call it, when they obtained a civil order 
to enter a home and seize property in that home, they obtained a private search 
warrant. Under the United States and Utah Constitutions, only a valid search 
warrant authorizes entry into a home without consent or a recognized exception 
to the warrant requirement. 
Defendants argue long and hard that the Lanham Act allows warrantless 
seizures of knockoff goods and indeed that Act does contain such a provision.4 
3(...continued) 
home without consent. Kopp, like defendants, did not obtain or have such 
consent. 
4None of the Lanham Act cases cited by defendants involved the invasion 
of a home, rather than a business. Privacy expectations are plainly much greater 
in a home than in a business and it might be argued under the Lanham Act that 
the Act was never intended to allow homes to be invaded and searched even if 
knock-off goods might be seized without a warrant. The one case cited in one 
(continued...) 
a 
There are well-defined procedures pursuant to rules written by the United States 
Supreme Court long ago that must be scrupulously followed before such an entry 
may occur. Even then, although the United States Supreme Court wrote those 
rules, it has never been presented with or decided a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Lanham Act's warrantless seizure provision and it is 
4(...continued) 
article about the Lanham Act cited in the Def. Br. that did involve a home did not 
involve any constitutional challenge to the seizure. Defendants use AT&T 
Broadband v. Tech Communs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2004), as an 
example of federal court approval of ex parte discovery orders "in other 
circumstances." Def. Br. at 39. In general terms, defendants attempt to apply that 
case as support for their argument that, although the Trade Secrets Act does not 
explicitly authorize the district court to issue an ex parte seizure order, the 
authority is inherently within the jurisdiction of the court under UTAH CODE ANN. § 
13-24-3(3). 
In AT&T Broadband, AT&T obtained an ex-parte order to enter a home 
and seize business records evidencing the /7/ega/ sale of cable descrambling 
devices under the Cable Communications Policy Act ("CCPA"). AT&T Broadband, 
381 F.3d at 1311-13. The defendant argued that because the CCPA did not 
provide explicit authorization to district courts to grant an ex parte search warrant 
like the Lanham Act, Congress did not intend to provide district courts with the 
authority to grant such orders. Id at 1319. The court of appeals determined that 
the district court had inherent equitable authority to issue a search warrant. Id. 
The AT&T Broadband court further discussed Lanham Act cases which 
required that ex parte seizures were proper "only if providing notice to the 
defendant would 'render fruitless the further prosecution of the action.'" Id. 
(quoting In re Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 606 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1979)(pe/-ci/r/am)).The 
court further explained that, "[t]o support an ex parte seizure motion, the plaintiff 
may not rely on bare assertions that the defendant, if given notice, would destroy 
relevant evidence," but, "[r]ather, the Plaintiff must 'show that [the] defendantf], or 
persons involved in similar activities, had ... concealed evidence or disregarded 
court orders in the past'" Id. (quoting First Tech. Safety Sys., Inc. v. Depinet, 11 
F.3d 641, 650-51 (6th Cir. 1993)). 
Defendants made no showing that providing notice to Yanaki would have 
"rendered fruitless the further prosecution of the action," and in fact they had 
available to them Yanaki's co-defendants who were alleged to have received the 
trade secrets they alleged Yanaki stole from which they could have obtained any 
evidence of stolen trade secrets. But regardless of AT&T Broadband, Allen v. 
Trueman prohibits such private search warrants in Utah. 
9 
recognized that the constitutionality under the United States Constitution is an 
open question. 
This Court's decision in Allen v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36, 49, 110 P.2d 355, 
361 (1941), put to rest any argument that such private search warrants may be 
used for any purpose in Utah. Allen was discussed extensively in the PI. Br., at 
20-23, so that discussion will not be repeated here. However, two reply points 
are worth covering. First, Allen dealt with a seizure of knockoff goods just as the 
Lnham Act would allow. So Lanham Act cases provide no guidance under Utah 
law. Second, the action in Allen, where this Court found constitutional violations 
under both the United States and Utah Constitutions in the use of private search 
warrants including, inter alia, Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
III. THE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS PRIVILEGE DOES NOT PROTECT AGAINST 
COMMON LAW TORT LIABILITY FOR WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF HOMES AND 
SEIZURES. 
Moss and Yanaki's arguments concerning the judicial proceedings 
privilege, addressing the applicable Utah law, have already been thoroughly 
presented in PI. Br., at 37-46 and will not be repeated here. Defendants' 
argument that the privilege precludes common law remedies for their non-
consensual, warrantless search and seizure is grounded largely in citations to 
numerous non-Utah cases that do not involve non-consensual, warrantless 
searches and seizures. 
Defendants assert that Durgin v. Cohen, 209 N.W. 532 (Minn. 1926) holds 
that the law does not forbid entry into a dwelling to execute a writ of replevin. 
10 
Def. Br. at 17, n.12. What defendants omit is that the plaintiff consented to allow 
officers into her home and no force or threats were used against the plaintiff. See 
id. at 532-33.5 
Defendants' examination of Utah law is equally flawed. They argue that 
Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, 164 P.3d 366 requires ambiguity as to whether the 
privilege should be applied to attorney conduct to be resolved in favor of applying 
the privilege. Def. Br. at 21. Pratt involved a 16-year-old girl whose father 
allegedly forced her to marry her uncle. Id. at ]f 4, 370. The girl filed a complaint 
against her father and over 240 other individuals alleging polygamous 
connections and intentional and negligent conduct in failing to prevent her alleged 
abuse. Id. After she filed the complaint, the girl and her attorney held a press 
conference and distributed copies of the complaint to national news sources. Id at 
Id. at H 4, 371. The individuals named in the complaint filed a lawsuit for 
defamation against the girl and her attorney. Id. at H 6. The girl's attorney claimed 
the defamation action based on the complaint was not actionable as protected by 
the judicial proceedings privilege. Id. at U 9, 372. 
This Court, discussed the three requirements of the privilege, the second of 
5
 Defendants argue that Clark v. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d 864 (W.Va. 2005) 
holds that there is no difference between communications or conduct occurring 
during litigation. Def. Br. at 18. The court in Clark was careful to apply the 
litigation privilege narrowly in limited circumstances. Clark, 624 S.E.2d at 870. 
Defendants omit to point out that the court excluded from the protection 
"intentional conduct which is unrelated to legitimate litigation tactics and which 
harms an opposing party." Id. at 870. Even if Clark extended the privilege to 
some conduct, then, it did not extend it to non-consensual, warrantless searches 
and seizures. 
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which being whether the statement has "some relationship to the cause or subject 
matter involved" in the litigation "although it 'need not be relevant or pertinent to 
the judicial proceeding from an evidentiary point of view for the privilege to apply." 
Id. at fl 30, 376 (quoting Debry v. Godbe, 1999 UT 111, fl 16, 992 P.2d 979). This 
court proclaimed "[t]hus, if doubt as to relevancy exists, it should be resolved in 
favor of the statement having reference to the subject matter of the proceeding." 
Id. (emphasis added). This Court did not speak to ambiguity about whether the 
privilege applied to conduct. Indeed, defamatory statements, not conduct, were 
involved in the case. The question was whether the girl's complaint was relevant 
to the subject matter of the litigation so as to allow the privilege to apply.6 
Defendants assert that Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642, 657 
(Idaho 2010) makes clear there is no difference between a litigation privilege and 
the judicial proceedings privilege. Def. Br. at 22 n.13, 25.7 They also cite Taylor 
defendants quote the following from Douglas R. Richmond, THE LAWYER'S 
LITIGATION PRIVILEGE, 31 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 281, 316 (Fall 2007): "[ajbsent 
malicious prosecution or similar allegations, a lawyer's bad faith litigation conduct 
is remedied by way of sanctions or professional discipline, not the loss of the 
litigation privilege with respect to a letter clearly within its scope." However, the 
cases discussed in the quoted article discuss the filing of paperwork or 
statements made during litigation. The article does not purport to address 
anything like a non-consensual warrantless search of a home and seizure of 
property, let alone one conducted through threats of violence. 
defendants cite Alpert v. Cram, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2005), for the contention that tort liability for attorney's statements 
or actions in the course of representing clients are so clearly barred by existing 
law that sanctions should be awarded. Def. Br. at 23. In Alpert, the plaintiff 
alleged that the defendant firm concealed their client's malpractice and breach of 
fiduciary duty to the plaintiff, filed frivolous lawsuits against the plaintiff, and 
disparaged plaintiffs reputation in the business community. Alpert, 178 S.W.3d at 
(continued...) 
12 
for the proposition that only where attorneys act separately from advancing his 
client's interests, the privilege does not apply. Def. Br. at 25. Defendants again 
omit the salient qualifier- for application of the litigation privilege an attorney must 
be "acting within the law, in a legitimate effort to zealously advance the interests 
of his client." Taylor at 656.8 Since defendants and their co-conspirators were not 
7(.. .continued) 
402. The trial court dismissed the case, holding that the plaintiff failed to set forth 
a claim or plead a cause of action under Texas law. Id. at 403. At that time, the 
trial court granted a motion for sanctions against plaintiff for attorney fees and 
expenses. Id. The court determined that "the trial court reasonably could have 
concluded from these facts that this lawsuit was filed on the 'eve of trial' for an 
improper purpose "including harassment, delay, needless cost and expense, and 
potential for lessening [defendant law firm's] zealous representation'" of its client, 
and upheld the trial court's award of sanctions against the plaintiff. Id. at 412. The 
facts in Alpert are thus clearly distinguishable from this case. Defendants also 
argue Reynolds v. Schrock, 142 P.3d 1062 (Ore. 2006), as holding that the 
litigation privilege extends to attorney conduct unless the conduct was outside the 
scope of the lawyer-client relationship. Def. Br. at 24. In Reynolds, plaintiff sued 
the defendant's client for breach of fiduciary duty, and sued the defendant 
attorney for his role in that alleged breach. Reynolds, 142 P.3d at 1063. This 
claim alone separates Reynolds as a claim for secondary liability since no lawyer 
conducted a warrantless search and seizure with the police. Defendants also cite 
Durham v. Guest, 171 P.3d 756 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007), which is also a secondary 
liability case. Def. Br. at 25. Secondary liability understandably requires an 
element of malice to imply wrongdoing sufficient to deny immunity via the 
litigation privilege, since the direct act is alleged against the attorney's client. 
Defendants also cite Unarco Material Handling, Inc. v. Liberato, 317 S.W.3d 227 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). Def. Br. at 25. The court in Unarco similarly decided 
whether a corporation's attorney induced its former president to breach the 
confidentiality provisions of a retirement agreement, a secondary liability claim. Id 
at 228. Durham and Unarco are not applicable to this case because, here, Moss 
and Yanaki directly seek damages from the defendants for their participation in 
the warrantless search and seizure itself, which is not protected by the litigation 
privilege. As previously discussed, the litigation privilege is only available to 
parties who are acting in accordance with the law. See Taylor, 243 P.3d at 656-
57. 
defendants argue that, as agents for lomed, Millennium Equity Holdings, 
(continued...) 
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invited into Moss and Yanaki's home but instead made a non-consensual 
warrantless entry, they were not acting within the law. So even if Utah ever 
adopted some litigation privilege as to conduct, this case would not fall within 
such a privilege. 
IV. Moss AND YANAKI DID NOT WAIVE "DEFECTS" IN THE PRIOR LITIGATION 
BECAUSE NO FINAL ORDER WAS ENTERED. 
Any argument of waiver of a defect in the ex parte seizure order is 
misplaced, since the former litigation was resolved through settlement. 
Defendants cite Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 581 P.2d 1001, 1002 (Utah 1978), to 
support their argument that Yanaki and Moss could have moved to quash the 
discovery orders because the affidavits did not describe property value, but that 
because they did not, they waived any defect. Def. Br. at 41.9 The ex parte 
(...continued) 
LLC v. Mahlowitz, 925 N.E.2d 513 (Mass. 2010), shields them from lomed's 
motive for their direction of their conduct of the litigation. Brief at 37. They quote 
the following from Millenium: "unless there is evidence to the contrary, a client's 
improper motivation should not be imputed to his attorney." Def. Br. at 37 (quoting 
Millennium, 925 N.E.2d at 532). Defendants argue that the complaint does not 
allege that defendants acted in bad faith other than conducting an unlawful 
search, since lomed's motives cannot be imputed to them. 
Millennium is a case involving a request for sanctions against the plaintiff's 
wife's attorneys in a divorce action for obtaining an attachment on property that 
plaintiff secretly planned to sell, in the form of malicious prosecution and abuse of 
process claims. Millennium, 925 N.E.2d at 516. Factually, this case is clearly 
distinguishable in that it is not for sanctions like in Millennium. Defendants did not 
seek a writ of attachment. They committed a non-consensual, warrantless 
search and seizure by threat of force. 
9
 Bank of Ephraim was a case involving a writ of attachment for defendant's 
personalty issued prior to the foreclosure sale of realty owned by defendant. Bank 
of Ephraim, 581 P.2d at 1002. Initially in that case, this Court recognized that the 
bank could not attempt to collect on the defendant's debt through the writ of 
(continued...) 
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private search warrant, procedurally defective or not, is not the valid search 
warrant that is required to conduct a non-consensual search and seizure. 
Defendants contend that because Yanaki did not move to quash the private 
search warrant because the affidavits were defective, Yanaki waived his right to 
contest any defect in the seizure order. Def. Br. at 41. Defendants argue that 
Bank of Pleasant Grove v. Johnson, 552 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1976), supports 
that contention because this Court determined that errors in an affidavit to secure 
the writ of attachment were harmless after the property had already been sold. 
Def. Br. at 41. What this Court actually determined was that the error in the 
attachment based upon a security interest was harmless because the property 
would ultimately still have been sold or repossessed by the party who obtained 
the order. Bank of Pleasant Grove, 552 P.2d at 1277.10 
Defendants cite Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist, 2008 UT 70, to support the 
argument that the issues in this case are the same as those in the case before 
9(.. .continued) 
attachment on the personal property until the security on the real property had 
been exhausted. Id. at 1003. Although the writ was lacking under Rule 64C(h), 
this failure was ultimately only a factor in determining that the writ was not valid. 
Id. at 1006. 
10Ban/c of Pleasant Grove blossomed from an effort to recover on a 
delinquent promissory note. Id. "The property was attached before judgment and 
was sold at a foreclosure sale after judgment was obtained." Id. Following the 
deficiency judgment, the defendants appealed and claimed that the technical 
defects in the affidavit on which the writ of attachment was obtained. Id. The court 
determined that there was no harm to defendants from the error, since the bank 
had a security interest in the property and could have repossessed it without a 
breach of the peace, and because the property would have been sold pursuant to 
court order. Id. Bank of Pleasant Grove thus is inapposite. 
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Judge Benson and should be prevented as a matter of issue preclusion. Def. Br. 
at 32. The initial cite to Oman outlines the elements of issue preclusion, in 
addition to the statement that "[W]here two causes of action embody the same 
dispositive issue, a prior determination of that issue in the context of one cause of 
action can have a preclusive effect in later litigation regarding the other cause of 
action." Id. quoting Oman, 2008 UT 70 a t f l 13. When Judge Benson dismissed 
Moss and Yanaki's section 1983 claims, he declined to exercise any 
jurisdiction over Moss and Yanaki's state court claims: "pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1367(c)(3) the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over 
Plaintiffs' remaining state law claims." Yanaki v. lomed, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 
1261, 1266 (D. Utah 2004). Since Judge Benson expressly declined to exercise 
any jurisdiction over Moss and Yanaki's state law claims, no preclusive effect 
exists as to those claims.11 
Defendants cite Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower Mt. Fonds, 2005 UT App 
11Judge Benson did, however, note the possible viability of such state law 
claims especially in light of the unreasonableness of the search and seizure. Id. 
at 1264-65 nn.7 & 8 ("Nonetheless, it appears clear that the conduct complained 
of in this case would be in violation of the Fourth Amendment if state action were 
involved. The invasion of Plaintiffs home, supported only by an ex parte 
submission of Plaintiffs' opponents in a civil lawsuit, appears to be precisely the 
type of unreasonable intrusion into a private dwelling that the Fourth Amendment 
is designed to prevent. Defendants' protestations to the contrary, an ex parte 
motion presented to a judge in the course of civil litigation is not the equivalent of 
a probable cause search warrant affidavit submitted by an independent law 
enforcement officer. If there was a sufficient basis for finding that Defendants' 
actions in this case were committed under color of state law, this Court would find 
that Plaintiffs were deprived of a right secured by the "Constitution and Laws" of 
the United States." and "[a]s noted in footnote seven, above, the behavior of the 
Defendants may have been inadvisable and abusive of Plaintiffs' rights, and may or may 
not give rise to other legal causes of action, such as perhaps abuse of process . . ..") 
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279, U 4, 119 P.3d 302, to combat the argument that they are estopped from 
arguing the seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment because Judge 
Benson, in a footnote, stated that, had there been state action, the seizure would 
have violated the Fourth Amendment. Brief at 35 n.19. They claim that the 
Dunlap case absolves them from needing to appeal a favorable ruling. Id. 
However, the court in Dunlap cites Halladay v. Cluff, 739 P.2d 643, 645 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987), stated that "'[c]ross-appeals are properly limited to grievances a party 
has with the judgment as it was entered-not grievances it might acquire 
depending on the outcome of the appeal.' Thus, a 'cross-appeal would not have 
been appropriate' since there was 'no dissatisfaction with the judgment which [the 
Dunlaps] simply wanted to have affirmed.' As a result, 'the absence of the cross-
appeal did not, of itself, foreclose the trial court from reassessing' the issue of 
adverse possession..'" Dunlap at P4 (internal citations omitted). 
Defendants present Buzzanco v. Lord Corp., 173 F. Supp. 2d 376 (W.D. 
Pa. 2001) as evidence that courts have held that claims on discovery orders were 
estopped if the orders were never challenged or found to be lawful in the lawsuit 
in which they were issued. Def. Br. at 45. Buzzanco simply does not recognize 
what Utah law does, namely, that a upon a settlement, any possible appeal is 
mooted. Phoenix Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Smith, 2002 UT 49, If 3, 48 P.3d 
976, 977 ("Moreover, 'where the actions of the parties themselves cause a 
settling of their differences, the case becomes moot,' and 'an appeal will be 
dismissed as moot where the matter raised was settled by agreement, such as by 
17 
. . . voluntary dismissal of a claim.' [citing 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 654 
(1995)]"). 
V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT PROTECT AGAINST COMMON LAW TORT 
LIABILITY FOR WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF HOMES AND SEIZURES. 
Moss and Yanaki's discussion of the First Amendment and its lack of 
applicability to the matter before this Court has already been thoroughly and 
sufficiently addressed in PI. Br. at 46-49 and will not be repeated. But defendants 
cite to numerous cases which are wholly inapplicable to the matter before this 
Court. Defendants contend that the First Amendment right to petition government 
protects them from common law liability for their warrantless search and seizure 
because of the holding in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 
404 U.S. 508 (1972). Def. Br. at 26-27. Their reading is incorrect. California Motor 
Transport is an antitrust case under the Clayton Act. It does not involve a non-
consensual and warrantless search and seizure. 
Defendants cite McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484 (1985), to support 
their application of California Motor Transport by quoting the following: "filing a 
complaint in court is a form of petitioning activity." Def. Br. at 27. McDonald 
actually undermines defendants' application of California Motor Transport by 
pointing out that the First Amendment Petition Clause does not provide absolute 
immunity. See McDonald, All U.S. at 485 ("Nor do the Court's decisions 
interpreting the Petition Clause in contexts other than defamation indicate the 
right to petition is absolute"). Further, the Court stated that "[t]he right to petition is 
guaranteed; the right to commit libel with impunity is not," demonstrating that the 
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Petition Clause does not protect against all tort liability, /of.12 Defendants contend 
that Cove Rd. Dev. v. Western Cranston Indus. ParkAssocs., 674 A.2d 1234, 
1237 (R.I. 1996), opens the right to petition beyond antitrust cases to include 
common-law tort claims, stating that the doctrine can bar claims for abuse of 
process. Def. Br. at 27. The plaintiff in Cove Rd. raised claims against defendants 
for malicious prosecution and abuse of process for instituting and pursuing an 
appeal of zoning amendments that were requested by the plaintiff and were 
granted by the municipality. Cove Rd., 674 A.2d at 1235. Once again, the claim in 
12Defendants quote Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Amoco Corp., 926 F. Supp. 948, 
956 (S.D. Cal. 1996), for the contention that "[t]he right to petition 'bars any claim, 
federal or state, common law or statutory, that has as its gravamen 
constitutionally-protected petitioning activity.'" Def. Br. at 27 (quoting Gen-Probe 
at 956). Defendants apply Gen-Probe to distinguish Bennett v. Jones Waldo 
Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, 70 P.3d 17, arguing that the "sham" 
exception does not apply unless the objective and subjective tests applied in 
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 
U.S. 49 (1993), are satisfied, and claiming that the allegations against the 
defendants cannot succeed because "a finding that the lawsuit is not objectively 
baseless precludes liability regardless of improper motive." Def. Br. at 28 (quoting 
Gen-Probe at 957). 
In Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 61-62 (1993), the 
Court set forth the two-pronged objective-subjective test to determine whether the 
challenged litigation was "outcome-driven and thus protected as an exercise of 
constitutional rights or whether the lawsuits are process-driven sham activities." 
The Court determined whether the suit was "objectively baseless in the sense 
that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits." PRE 
at 61-62. The Court explained that: "Only if the challenged litigation is objectively 
meritless may a court examine the litigant's subjective motivation. Under this 
second part of our definition of sham, the court should focus on whether the 
baseless lawsuit conceals 'an attempt to interfere directly with the business 
relationships of a competitor', through the use [of] the governmental process - as 
opposed to the outcome of that process - as an anti-competitive weapon." PRE 
at 60-61. The Court further stated that "[tjhis two-tiered process requires the 
plaintiff to disprove the challenged lawsuit's legal viability before the court will 
entertain evidence of the suit's economic viability." Id at 61 (emphasis in original). 
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that case is based on filing paperwork with the court, which is substantially 
different from committing a non-consensual warrantless seqarch and seizure of a 
home.13 
Defendants quote Anderson Dev. Co. v Tobias, 2005 UT 36, P26, 116 P.3d 
323, as a "see also," and include the following text: "[U]nder the sham exception, 
an individual will be liable if he uses the governmental process - as opposed to 
the outcome of that process - as a weapon." Brief at 27 (quoting Anderson Dev. 
Co., 2005 UT 36 at P27). In Anderson, the matter at issue to which the sham 
exception is applied involved a petition to the city council to "derail" a zoning 
change application. Anderson Dev Co., 2005 UT 36 at P25. The court in 
Anderson quoted City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 
380 (1991): "A 'sham' situation involves a defendant whose activities are not 
genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action at all, not one who 
genuinely seeks to achieve his governmental result, but does so through 
improper means."(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
There were no facts alleged in the Anderson case that brought the matter 
in issue within the sham exception. Id at P28. Clearly, Anderson is 
13ln addition, the court discussed its decision in Pound Hill Corp., Inc., v. 
Perl, 668 A.2d 1260 (R.I. 1996). In Pound Hill, the court determined that summary 
judgment was proper because a trier of fact could determine that the defendants' 
activities were objectively baseless. Id at 1264. The court determined, inter alia, 
that the defendants pursued an appeal presenting "no substantive ground for 
such an appeal." Id. Like in Pound Hill, defendants had no substantive ground for 
their effort to obtain the search warrant, since they, as civil lawyers, cannot legally 
obtain a search warrant. Also, they had no substantive ground to enforce the 
search warrant, especially not by threat of force. 
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distinguishable in that defendants sought to obtain an illegal search warrant and 
executed an illegal, warrantless search for the illegitimate purpose of scaring 
lomed employees. Defendants' goal was intimidation through the illegal search 
rather than to obtain or protect any evidence as they claim. 
VI. QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY WAS NOT RAISED BELOW AND IN ANY EVENT IF IT 
COULD APPLY AT ALL IT WOULD RAISE A FACT QUESTION NOT RESOLVABLE 
ON A PLEADINGS MOTION. 
Defendants argue for the first time that they are immune under the doctrine 
of quasi-judicial immunity, the same immunity granted in the section 1983 action 
to the sheriff's deputies by the federal court. Def. Br. at 35-36.14 In Parker, two 
plaintiffs filed a suit against a psychologist who was a court-appointed evaluator 
in the underlying custody battle. Parker, 971 P.2d at 496. This Court upheld the 
application of quasi-judicial immunity to the psychologist, /of.15 This Court 
continued: 
"Thus, 'immunity is justified and defined by the functions it protects and 
serves, not by the person to whom it attaches.'" Forrester v. White, 484 
U.S. 219, 227 (1998); see also Awai v. Kotin, 872 P.2d 1332, 1334-35 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1993). Furthermore, "because absolute immunity derives, 
14Defendants cite Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496, 498 (Utah 1998), to 
suggest that this Court has drawn upon federal law when defining Utah's doctrine 
of quasi-judicial immunity. Def. Br. at 36. 
15This Court cited its decision in Bailey v. Utah State Bar, 846 P.2d 1278, 
1280 (Utah 1993), where it had held that the Utah State Bar was entitled to 
immunity when acting within the scope of its delegated judicial functions. See 
Parker, 971 P.2d at 498. This Court had reasoned in Bailey that "Whether a 
person or entity should be afforded judicial immunity depends upon the specific 
work or function performed. If the acts were committed 'in the performance of an 
integral part of the judicial process,' the policies underlying judicial immunity apply 
and immunity should be granted." Bailey, 846 P.2d at 1280 (internal citations 
omitted) (quoting Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1965)). 
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not from formal association with the judicial process, but from the need to 
protect functions intimately related and essential to the judicial decision-
making process, its protections may extend to some but not all acts 
performed by those associated with the judicial process.' Awai, 872 P.2d at 
1334. For example, 'immunity is not established merely because a court 
appointee performed acts within the scope of [a] court's order. While 
performing acts within the scope of [a] court's order may in some 
circumstances be necessary to establish immunity, it is not sufficient...It is 
still necessary to establish that the acts performed were intimately related 
and essential to the judicial decision-making process.' Awai, 872 P.2d at 
1335, 36." 
Parker, 971 P.2d at 498 (emphasis in original).16 
The facts of this case are remarkably distinguishable. Defendants were not 
appointed by the court to execute a valid search warrant. Rather, they conspired 
to commit a non-consensual and warrantless search and seizure. They 
additionally had no discretionary judgment, comparable to that of a judge. All of 
those issues raisee fact questions not resolvable on a pleadings motion. 
VII. THE FAC OTHERWISE STATES A CLAIM.17 
Defendants cite Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 563 (Utah 1988), to assert 
that a right of privacy is invaded only by an "unreasonable intrusion upon the 
16This Court also reasoned that psychologists are essentially acting as a 
neutral fact-finder for the court. Id. The court also followed uniformly-held 
determination that court-appointed psychologists perform a function integral to 
the judicial process and are therefore immune from suit. Id at 499. 
17Defendants ask the court to reject all of the Opening Briefs "legal 
conclusions" about defendants' actions being constitutional violations, and cite 
the following quote from Jensen: "Legal conclusions, deductions, and opinions 
couched as facts are ... not presumed to be true." Def. Br. at 29 (quoting Jensen 
v. Reeves, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1270 (D. Utah 1999)). The court in Jensen made 
this statement in the context of whether the complaint was sufficient, and, more 
specifically, whether the plaintiff was entitled to offer evidence to support its 
claims. Jensen, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1270. For this reason, application of Jensen is 
misplaced. 
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seclusion of another." The plaintiffs in Cox sued when Senator Orrin Hatch used 
their photographs in a political flier, id. at 558, and the court determined the First 
Amendment barred the invasion of privacy claim and there was no claim for relief 
because the facts failed to meet the requirements for a false light tort action. 
Defendants omit to state that the postal workers agreed to have their 
photographs taken, the invasion of privacy claim was a false light claim and that 
New York Times malice was applicable. Id. at 558, 564 & n.8. 
Defendants argue that court-ordered discovery is not an unreasonable 
intrusion, and quote the court's decision in Big Five Cmty. Servs. v. Jack, 782 
P.2d 412, 414 (Okla. Civ. App. 1989), "[w]e cannot say the copying of documents 
pursuant to court-ordered discovery constitutes an unreasonable intrusion into 
the seclusion of another so as to support a cause of action for invasion of 
privacy." Moss and Yanaki agree that copying documents is not an unreasonable 
intrusion. A warrantless search and seizure in their home is. 
Defendants cite Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238 (Utah 
1998), as support for their assertion that "trespass is a 'wrongful entry...upon the 
lands of another," and that, because the entry into Yanaki's house was 
undertaken on alleged authority of a court order, the entry was not wrongful as a 
matter of law. Def. Br. at 48 (quoting Walker Drug, 972 P.2d at 1243). Walker 
Drug did not involve the non-consensual warrantless search and seizure involved 
in this case. 
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Defendants assert that the conspiracy claim fails because attorneys cannot 
conspire with clients while acting as their agents, and cite to Peterson v. Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., 2002 UT App 56, P12, 42 P.3d 1253, to argue that recovery under a 
civil conspiracy theory requires that conspirators must commit one or more 
"unlawful, overt acts." Defendants claim that simply because the other tort claims 
fail, no unlawful, overt act occurred that would support a conspiracy claim. Def. 
Br. at 49. Peterson quotes from Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 
792 (Utah Ct. App. 1987): "To assert a civil conspiracy, plaintiff must also prove 
that the alleged conspirators performed one or more unlawful, overt acts. If the 
object of the alleged conspiracy or the means used to attain it is lawful, even if 
damage results to the plaintiff or the defendant acted with a malicious motive, 
there can be no civil conspiracy." Peterson, 2002 UT App 56, U 12.18 
Defendants quote the following from Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 
P.2d 785, 794 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), to support their claim that no conspiracy 
existed because no unlawful act was committed: "[T]he conspiracy itself is not 
what gives rise to the right to action, but the torts committed in the furtherance of 
the conspiracy." Def. Br. at 49. The application of that case assumes there was 
18
 Peterson was based on the plaintiff's grievance against his employer for 
failing to allow him to take his "final flight" as an airline pilot prior to his retirement 
because of allegations of his abuse of the sick leave policy. Id. at H 5. In 
Peterson, the only allegedly unlawful event referenced in the Plaintiff's complaint 
was that defendant required the plaintiff to be in Los Angeles to deliver a note 
from his physician certifying his illness. Id. The plaintiff later attempted to amend 
his complaint to allege that the defendant unlawfully withheld his flight privileges 
following the investigation based merely on malicious motive. Id. at f^ 12. Clearly, 
there is no factual application of Peterson to this case. 
OA 
no tort committed, which is not accurate. 
CONCLUSION 
The warrant requirement of the United States and Utah Constitutions is a 
protection that may not be lightly cast aside. This Court has already refused to 
do so in Allen. The Court should now extend Allen and hold that common law 
remedies exist for home invasions by private litigants who possess neither the 
consent of the homeowners nor are accompanied by peace officers who do not 
hold valis search warrants. In those circumstances, the FAC states a claim and 
so the court of appeals' decision should be reversed and the case remanded. 
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